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In line with recent suggestions about the potential positive effects of subsistence agriculture in 
fragile economies, this paper discusses and explains the effects of subsistence agriculture with 
emphasis on transition countries. Some micro-economic models of subsistence agriculture are 
reviewed  and  a  two-stage  decision  model,  combining  risk  aversion  and  transaction  costs 
explanations for subsistence is put forward. The role of subsistence agriculture is addressed in 
terms of a static comparison to a commercial only agriculture. It is shown that, under some 
conditions,  subsistence  can  play  a  stabilising  role  and  have  positive  impacts  on  total 
agriculture.  Employing  the  concept  of  a  subsistence  level  of  consumption,  the  paper 
demonstrates  that  these  static  effects  can  be  valid  in  a  dynamic  perspective,  provided 
additional conditions are met. Policy recommendations and a future research agenda with 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  processes  of  economic  transition  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  brought  about  an 
unexpected result; the emergence and growth of subsistence agriculture of considerable size 
in relation to the total agricultural sector. It is difficult to provide a widely accepted definition 
of the term subsistence agriculture since it has been used “synonymously with such other 
concepts as traditional, small scale, peasant, low income, resource poor, low-input or low 
technology  farming”  (Brüntrup  and  Heidhues,  2002).  A  wide  range  of  views  of  what 
constitutes  subsistence  agriculture  is  presented  in  Wharton  (1970).  Arguably  the  simplest 
definition of subsistence is that of Mosher (1970) who defines subsistence farmers as those 
who sell less than 50% of their production. This measures subsistence from a production point 
of view. Alternatively subsistence may be defined with regard to consumption, e.g. “farming 
in  which  crop  production, livestock rearing  and  other  activities  are  conducted  mainly  for 
personal consumption” (Todaro, 1995). Although the former definition is more convenient 
with regard to building quantitative models, due to the relative ease of obtaining the relevant 
data (Beckmann and Pavel, 2000; Mishev et al., 2002), the latter is more appropriate for 
measuring the significance of subsistence in the overall agricultural economy (Tho Seeth et 
al., 1998; Caskie, 2000; Kostov and Lingard, 2002). To add to the above ambiguities, since 
“the  subsistence  factor  underlines  every  economy”  (Gudeman,  1978),  any  measure  of 
subsistence may vary from almost zero to 100%. Therefore 50% is a rather arbitrary cut-off 
point and the ‘pure’ subsistence state of 100% is unrealistic. Owing to this one may prefer to 
use the term semi-subsistence, emphasising prevalence of non-marketed production, but also 
denoting the existence of some marketed production. It is also useful to note that all the above 
definitions consider subsistence as a concept of market integration. This is the main meaning 
of subsistence used in the paper.  There is also an alternative use of this term used for living 
standard measurement, which will be introduced later.  
The extent of subsistence farming varies from country to country in transition economies, but 
what is striking is its universal presence. It is difficult to provide a comprehensive picture of 
the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, but the relative size of subsistence agriculture is 
considerable.  Over  half  the  consumption  of  major  agricultural  products  in  Bulgaria  is 
provided from self-sufficient small production units (Mishev et al. 1999, Kostov and Lingard, 
2002).  According  to  survey  data,  51%  of  Romanian  farm  households  do  not  sell  any 
production (Sarris et al. 1999) and in a survey for Bulgaria the figure is even higher with 
77.25%  of  individual  farms  failing  to  sell  any  production.  About  40%  of  the  overall   3
agricultural output in Russia in 1995
1 could be attributed to the small scale self-sufficient 
sector  (Serova  et  al.,  1999).  In  Poland  “  …over  half  of  all  farms  have  practically  no 
involvement with the market” (Kwasniewski, 1999). The low share of marketed production is 
however not a characteristic only of the small farms. Kostov and Lingard (2002) report data, 
which shows that only the largest production units in Bulgarian agriculture can be defined as 
commercially oriented (in that most of them sell the larger part of their production
2). In spite 
of the relative scarcity of data on the relative share of subsistence, it seems to be negatively 
correlated to the level of economic development of the corresponding country, the latter being 
measured e.g. in GDP per capita. Mergos (2002) asserts that while this phenomenon deserves 
special attention in poorer countries, it may be ignored for the more developed CEECs
3.  
It took time for analysts of transition to fully recognise the phenomenon. One possible reason 
for this delay is the association of subsistence agriculture with the experience in developing 
countries. Such an association invokes an image of underdevelopment, which is a politically 
sensitive  area  in  countries,  striving  for  accession  to  the  EU.  Viewing  subsistence  as  the 
consequence of wrong economic (price) signals, absent infrastructure, and missing access to 
input and output markets, may lead to the conclusion that it is a result of imperfect economic 
policy. But if this is the case, as transition progresses, markets improve, infrastructure will 
develop and subsistence should fade away. The experience of transition countries so far does 
not fit this picture. 
The analysis of subsistence agriculture in transition countries passed through two distinct 
stages. The first was recognition of the problem and its dimensions. Early examples of this 
type of analysis include Mishev (1997), FAO (1999), OECD (1999), Sarris et al. (1999) and 
the political recognition in Kwasnewski (1999). Even at this early stage, a major disagreement 
about the nature of subsistence in transition economies emerged. While OECD (1999) and 
Sarris  et  al.  (1999)  maintain  that  subsistence  is  an  unviable  alternative  to  commercial 
agriculture  and  a  threat  to  agricultural  development,  Tho  Seeth  et  al.  (1998)  and  Caskie 
(2000) argue that subsistence is a consequence of the worsened economic situation during 
transition.  This  is  an  important  divergence  of  opinions.  We  emphasise  the  economic 
significance of this split of views. According to the former, the existence of subsistence is a 
                                                            
1 Note that currently this share is probably higher. 
2 This data has to be interpreted with caution since some vertical integration (e.g. using on-farm produced feed as 
further input for livestock production) can artificially lower the share of marketed production. 
3 The only two countries considered in this collection of analytical studies are Bulgaria and Slovenia, presumably 
at the opposite ends of the scale of subsistence in Central and Eastern Europe.  Consequently the problem of 
subsistence is analysed in detail for Bulgaria, but not in the case of Slovenia.    4
phenomenon  that  causes  inefficiency,  while  the  latter  states,  in  the  tradition  of  Schultz’s 
(1964) ”poor but efficient” hypothesis of small farmer behaviour, that since subsistence is an 
(efficient)  adaptation  to  the  environment,  this  is  unlikely  to  be  the  case.    The  policy 
implications of these two views are rather different. The former suggests policies aimed at 
discouraging subsistence behaviour, while the latter implicitly warns against this (Brüntrup 
and  Heidhues,  2002:  20).  Kostov  (2002)  asserts  that  policies  to  suppress  subsistence 
production may be actually detrimental, as for example the forced collectivisation in Soviet 
Russia in the 1920s which managed to (temporarily) eradicate subsistence at the price of 
widespread famine. One of the aims of the present paper is to reconcile these conflicting 
views. 
The second stage of analysis of subsistence agriculture in the context of economic transition, 
tried  to substantiate  the qualitative claims about the nature of subsistence agriculture and 
incorporate  it  into  formal  quantitative  models.  The  gap  in  understanding  the  qualitative 
characteristics  of  subsistence  agriculture  has  been  resolved  in  two  ways:  by  fitting  the 
problem into an accepted mould of existing formal approaches as in Beckmann and Pavel 
(2000) and Werheim and Wobst (2001) and by redefining the problem in terms of desirable 
agricultural commercialisation (e.g. Mishev et al., 2002). Both approaches have merits and 
disadvantages,  but  their  simulation  results  confirm  the  relative  stability  of  subsistence 
agriculture in terms of its share in the overall agricultural economy. The main issue of interest 
addressed in the literature is not the magnitude of subsistence per se, but how to politically 
support a continuous shift from subsistence to commercial. Results of these models suggest 
that such a shift is much more likely when the driving force of commercialisation are income 
and  job  opportunities  outside  agriculture
4.  This  is  consistent  with  the  finding  that  the 
deterioration in agricultural incomes during transition has been caused by the collapse of non-
agricultural  activities  (Kostov  et  al.,  1996)  and  the  examples  of  successful  agricultural 
commercialisation where this shift has been driven by forces external to agriculture (Pingali, 
1997). 
It is necessary to provide a conceptual model of the effects of subsistence agriculture that 
sheds some light on the disagreements about the role and nature of subsistence agriculture in 
transition. To do this we first consider the microeconomic foundations and explanations of 
subsistence  agriculture.  Then  argument  about  the  macroeconomic  stabilising  role  of 
                                                            
4 Beckmann and Pavel (2000) model this shift in terms of agricultural opportunities only and the decrease in the 
share of subsistence agriculture they obtain is much smaller than in Mishev et. al. (2002) who express the latter 
in terms of a general income indicator.   5
subsistence agriculture is presented. The latter will then be reconsidered in a more dynamic 
framework. 
 
2. Micro-models of subsistence agriculture 
We consider two basic models explaining the self-sufficient orientation of poor, small-scale 
farmers. The first is based on the transaction cost concept. De Janvry and Sadoulet (1994, 
p.141) demonstrate that the existence of transaction costs implies a price band determined by 
the effective price received for items sold and the effective price for items purchased. There 
might exist a range of products and factors for which equilibrium between supply and demand 
occurs within this price band. In this case, the equilibrium (shadow) price is higher than the 
sale price and lower than the purchase price, with the result that neither sale nor purchase are 
desired, and there is self-sufficiency in this commodity or factor. Thus a commodity is not by 
its nature a tradable or non-tradable one, and a farm is then defined as subsistence- or market-
oriented by externally determined prices and transaction costs specific to each decision unit. 
Löfgren and Robinson (1999, 2003) adopt the same framework and argue that production and 
consumption decisions should be viewed as non-separable. The rationale behind this is: when 
transaction  costs  are  small  and  thus  the  above  band  is  narrow,  shadow  prices  can  be 
reasonably approximated by market prices. In this case production and consumption can be 
regarded as separable. When the price band due to transaction costs widens however, these 
decisions become interrelated and thus non-separable. 
The other explanation builds on the finding of extreme risk aversion of poor farmers. The 
transaction  cost  model  only  considers  the  price  risk,  while  risk-based  explanations  of 
subsistence behaviour consider a much wider range of risks. When survival of the household 
is  at  stake  and  subsistence  production  offers  an  effective  protection,  the  degree  of  risk 
aversion will increase and thus poor farmers cannot be considered risk neutral but rather risk 
averse  (Brüntrup  and  Heidhues,  2002).    This  result  would  not  differ  when  one  replaces 
survival  by  any  other  serious  consequence  deemed  unacceptable  by  the  decision  makers 
(hunger periods, the sale of (productive or other) assets). Risk aversion elicitation tests and 
experiments repeatedly show that risk aversion increases with the level of risk involved, and 
that for extreme probabilities and outcomes people do not classify decisions according to 
utility theory (Binswanger 1980, Tversky and Kahnemann 1982, Brüntrup 1997). Moreover, 
Kostov and Lingard (2003) argue that that it is the (deemed) importance of the consequences 
rather that the  magnitude  of  the probabilities  that  determine whether  a rational  economic   6
agent  should  employ  risk  avoidance  strategies.  For  a  more  comprehensive  review  of 
alternative theories and views on risk coping strategies see Hazell and Norton (1986), Upton 
(1987), Brüntrup and Heidhues (2002), Kostov and Lingard (2003).  
The non-separability of production and consumption is an important characteristic of farm 
household  models.  It  is  a direct  consequence  from  the  existence  of  transaction  costs  that 
create a gap between purchase and selling price. Nevertheless the notion of non-separability is 
only true ex-ante. To clarify this one has to take into account that the decision making process 
of  farmers  is  extended  over  a  long  period  of  time  often  characterised  by  high  risk  and 
uncertainty. One may distinguish two distinct decisions of farmers. The first is, as suggested 
by Löfgren and Robinson (1999, 2003), the decision whether to buy or to produce
5. This ex-
ante  with  regard  to  the  production  process  decision  is  non-separable.  Once  production  is 
available however, at some later stage, the farmer has to decide whether to sell it or to keep it 
for own consumption. At this stage it is too late to change the choice made ex-ante, and in this 
case the decision whether to sell or hold onto the produce is separable with regard to the 
production choice (Mishev and Kostov, 2002)
6. We get into a situation where decisions are 
non-separable ex-ante (i.e. at the first stage) but separable ex-post. Confusing the decisions 
made at one of these stages may lead to contradictory results and recommendations and it is 
necessary to specify which of these two decisions is being considered.  Hence the separability 
of production and consumption decisions becomes a matter of analytical focus. When the aim 
is to build a simulation model of small scale farming, one needs to model them as non-
separable. The reason for this is that simulation models (unless stochastic) need to conflate the 
above two decisions into one using either the assumption of perfect foresight or some other 
form  of  expectational  dynamics.  Note  that  whatever  form  of  expectational  dynamics  is 
specified for empirical purposes it will need to hold also at the second stage (i.e. when the 
production  is  available).  These  models  do  not  consider  the  second  stage  of  the  decision 
process, but this is a necessary feature of such models. Otherwise their functionality would be 
impaired. In this case from the pair of decisions produce/buy and sell/consume one gets to the 
conflated decision problem produce / consume. 
When the emphasis is on obtaining a descriptive explanation of a phenomenon however, the 
assumptions employed need not be so restrictive. In this case one may wish to consider the 
above two-stage decision process. In order to do so we basically combine the transaction cost 
                                                            
5 Strictly speaking Löfgren and Robinson (1999, 2003) speak about the decision to produce or to consume, as do 
Mishev and Kostov (2002). Nevertheless a careful analysis of their statements reveals that they actually refer to 
the two distinct stages of the decision process discussed here. 
6 See the previous note.   7
and the risk aversion models. The role of risk aversion is in modifying the expectational 
element  of  the  model.  When  the  perceived  consequences  of  unfavourable  outcomes  are 
serious as is the case with poor farmers, the risk aversion increases. In practical terms this 
means that decisions at the first stage will be aimed at risk avoidance. This may take place via 
diversification.  For  example  Rosenzweig  and  Binswanger  (1993)  found  that  in  riskier 
environments, portfolio assets less sensitive to weather but less profitable were chosen. On the 
other hand diversification may be a means to maximize use of all resources available to the 
household  (Ellis,  1988;  Reardon  et  al.,  1992;  Valdivia  et  al.,  1996)  and  thus  reduce  risk 
exposure.  Farm  households  regularly  save  and  build  assets  for  various  reasons,  which  is 
another form of risk coping strategy (Rutherford 2000).  
When diversification opportunities such as alternative employment and incomes, as well as 
asset building possibilities
7, are restricted, the strategy would imply making full use of the 
available  production  potential.  The  latter  means  that  the  decision  whether  to  produce  or 
consume may be predetermined in favour of production (Kostov and Lingard, 2002), because 
producing maximises the survival capacity of small farmers in highly uncertain environments. 
It can be shown that in this case the price elasticity of production decreases (De Janvry et al., 
2003; Key et al., 1999; Kostov, 2002).  The extent to which the price elasticity will decrease 
and even the sign of this price elasticity, depend on the motives for producing. Ozanne (1999) 
shows that there are two conflicting models about the production response of subsistence 
farmers. When their primary motive is to secure their consumption, they will try to sell the 
marketable  surplus.  In  this  case  a  better  harvest  will  result  (ceteris  paribus)  in  higher 
aggregate  marketable  surplus  and  thus  a  lower  price.  If  however  the  main  motivation  of 
subsistence farmers is to produce for sale, then consumption becomes the residual term. In the 
latter case the marketed quantities will generally be positively correlated to price. These two 
types of motivation defined by Kostov and Lingard (2002) as respectively subsistence and 
market orientation denote qualitatively different modes of behaviour. Note that if we denote 
by PB, PS, and PE the purchase, sale and the expected shadow prices (PB > PS), then the above 
two motivations can be cast in the transaction cost framework and correspondingly expressed 
as PB > PE > PS, and PE > PB. The latter means that the subsistence orientation means that 
farmers  expect  ex-ante  to  be  self-sufficient  in  this  product,  and  similarly  the  market 
orientation  represents  an  expectation  about  full  market  participation.  The  content  of  the 
orientation concept is however much richer. In addition to the expectation element, it has a 
                                                            
7 Kostov (2002) argues that while uncertainty encourages asset building, it discourages the use of available assets 
for consumption purposes, thus anchoring consumption to the current level of production.   8
component of uncertain anticipation. Let us first assume that orientation can be expressed in 
terms of expectations only. Then even if expectations are not assumed to be self-fulfilling, the 
market orientation of subsistence farmers becomes dubious if they consistently fail to market 
their produce, since it assumes the lack of learning. How can one assert that subsistence 
farmer is market oriented if he/she does not sell in several successive years? Why are the 
expectations  not  modified  accordingly?  The  uncertain  anticipation  element  means  that 
farmers do not simply expect whether they will be self-sufficient in this product or sell, but 
also that they are prepared for a surprising change in the environment. Their environment is 
viewed as uncertain and in the case of  market orientation, they organise their production 
decisions in such a way that  if an opportunity to sell  arises, they are prepared  to do so. 
Similarly in the case of subsistence orientation, the provision of basic food security is the 
major concern, and they anticipate shocks that may endanger the latter.  Therefore it is the 
anticipation of market or subsistence situation, which defines the orientation of subsistence 
farmers, while the expectations may be for subsistence. Unfortunately the transaction cost 
paradigm is static and does not account for such a distinction. If one adopts the concept of 
dynamic transaction costs (Langlois, 1992), which involves “costs of persuading, negotiating, 
coordinating with and teaching” other market participants with relation to change (Langlois, 
1992),  then  one  may  define  orientation  in  terms  of  expectations  with  regard  to  dynamic 
transaction costs. Unlike conventional transaction costs, which are static in the sense that they 
are measures against the status quo, dynamic transaction costs are evaluated only against the 
benchmark of a change. The orientation is a dynamic concept, because it measures the ex-ante 
response  of  subsistence  farmers  to  change.  With  a  view  to  possible  agricultural 
commercialisation,  subsistence  oriented  farmers  are  not  prepared  for  arising  market 
opportunities,  while  market  oriented  ones  are.  This  can  lead  to  two  different  modes  of 
commercialisation.  Market  oriented  subsistence  farmers  are  ready  to  become  truly 
commercial farmers, whilst the only way out of subsistence for subsistence oriented farmers is 
exit from agriculture.  
Kostov and Lingard (2002) argue that orientation is product specific and is relatively stable 
over time, although in the case of Bulgarian agriculture they consider, farmers are mainly 
market oriented. It is nevertheless important to distinguish between the orientation concept 
and  actual  market  participation,  which  is  the  focus  of  the  transaction  cost  model.  The 
hypothesised relative stability of the orientation of poor farmers may be justified by their 
extreme  risk  aversion.  The  latter  may  be  derived  from  the  two-stage  decision  process 
extended in time. When poor farmers fail to sell a significant part of their production, they   9
restrict their cash receipts. With limited resources, their risk aversion increases (because they 
have less assets to overcome emergencies). In this way the highly uncertain environment 
holds subsistence farmers in a poverty trap. 
One  is  tempted  to  transfer  what  development  economics  has  established  for  subsistence 
farming in developing countries to countries in transition. This would however be hindered by 
an  impediment,  namely  an  assertion  that  the  small-scale  private  agriculture,  described 
nowadays as subsistence, has been the sector of the centrally planned economy, most closely 
identified as a market one (Kornai, 1992). Kostov and Lingard (2002) develop the latter thesis 
in detail for Bulgaria. In terms of the two-stage decision process discussed, this means that 
while the poor farmers in developing countries are predominantly subsistence oriented, they 
are mainly market oriented in transition countries. This assertion needs to be interpreted with 
caution  since  the  orientation  appears  to  be  product  dependent.  A  formal  mathematical 
representation of the two-stage decision making process of subsistence farmers is presented in 
Appendix 1. 
 
3. A conceptual model of the effects of subsistence agriculture. 
The micro-economic justification for subsistence behaviour can now be considered a stylised 
fact in development economics. The macro-economic repercussions of this micro-economic 
phenomenon are much less clear and are increasingly the focus of economic policy (Timmer, 
1997). An efficiency argument with regard to subsistence agriculture has recently emerged. 
At this end “…we will argue that, although subsistence agriculture may at first sight appear to 
be an impediment for economic growth, it often is the only way for rural people to survive 
under  extremely  difficult  conditions,  such  as  inefficient  input,  output,  credit  and  labour 
markets, risks and uncertainties. Under such conditions subsistence agriculture should not 
only be considered as a passive adaptation, it can even play an important role in stabilizing 
fragile economies.” (Brüntrup and Heidhues, 2002: 2). Kostov and Lingard (2002) argue that 
even  if  the  small-scale  subsistence  and  semi-subsistence  farms  exhibit  lower  technical 
efficiency, the aggregate effects of their existence, when compared to a totally commercial 
agriculture, are positive both in terms of production and consumption. We investigate whether 
and under what circumstances such positive production and consumption effects might arise.  
Let P0 be the minimum price that covers the costs of a commercial farm. It is possible in 
principle under low incomes to get the situation represented in figure 1 by S0 and D0. S0 is the 
hypothetical supply curve under conditions of full employment of all resources and a totally   10
commercial agriculture. With price below P0 there is no (commercial) production (if P< P0 
then S0 = 0). That is, the supply curve is discontinued (it consist of OQ0 and S0). In the case of 
low incomes, it is possible that the demand curve (D0) passes through the discontinuity. There 
can thus be no equilibrium in this case. The necessary (though not sufficient) preconditions 
for existence of such a discontinuity, in addition to low incomes, are full employment of the 
available resources, totally commercial production (i.e. self-sufficient production is ruled out) 
and non-negative profits.  They ensure that S0 may be discontinued at P0.  Such a situation is 
hypothetical, because it is impossible to ensure combination of these conditions. Since the 
process of ‘eliminating’ the hypothetical discontinuity in the production function may give 
rise  to  multiple  equilibria,  we  may  compare  the  set  of  equilibria,  ensuing  from  a  totally 
commercial agriculture to the equivalent set in the case where there is subsistence agriculture. 
 
Insert Figure 1. 
 
The  standard  approach  to  achieving  equilibrium  in  the  case  of  discontinuities  in  the 
production possibilities frontier and a demand curve passing through this discontinuity is by 
quantity  rationing  (Heal,  1969)  or  price  discrimination  (Edlin  et  al.,  1998).  Let  us  first 
consider the case of quantity rationing. Quantity rationing of supply can help us to reach 
almost any point on the demand curve in the discontinuity (in this case all points where the 
price exceeds the minimum price P0) and thus achieve an equilibrium. The role of quantity 
rationing in this case is to shift supply curves into the discontinuity region. We note that 
quantity rationing of supply will be caused by competitive market forces. This will lead to 
less than full employment of the resources available in the agricultural sector. 
The  essential  difference  of  this  type  of  adjustment  is  that  the  act  of  quantity  rationing 
represents a significant structural change in production. Supply is being adjusted not to price 
signals,  but  to  quantity  information  about  demand.  The  importance  of  this  quantity 
information is not simply reminiscent of some comparison between market mechanism and 
central  planning.  Both  price  and  quantity  information  are  needed  and  essential  in  a  real 
economy  (see  Kornai  (1971)  on  the  complex  informational  structure  of  the  economic 
systems).  What  equilibrium  economics  does  is  to  rule  out  the  quantity  information  by 
assuming away non-convexities and thus conflating the needed information into the price 
signal. Furthermore, this multidimensional signal is demoted to a single price vector.   11
Dehez and Dreze (1988) present a mathematical analysis of the equilibrating forces in an 
economy  based  on  information  about  quantities.  Their  lemma  2  states  that  in  a  convex 
economy, competitive prices  may be retrieved from voluntary trading by lowering output 
prices. In other words, price adjustments are sufficient to clear the market in the convex case. 
In the non-convex case, this is no longer possible. Quantity cannot be fixed in this case and 
market  stability  would  require  economic  agents  to  decide  on  both  prices  and  quantities 
produced. Since they present their argument for an arbitrary pricing rule, one would expect 
that in the non-convex case the relative excess supply associated with prices would prevail. 
To put it explicitly, while in the convex case, prices can be adjusted to given quantities or 
alternatively quantities can be changed to meet given prices, thus creating a duality between 
the price and quantity selection problems, this is no longer true for a non-convex economy. 
The optimisation problem becomes self-dual in the sense that it requires prices and quantities 
to be adjusted simultaneously.  
Supply quantity rationing takes place in agriculture via the exit of commercial farms. This 
will shift the supply curve leftwards. S1 represents this shifted supply curve, which crosses the 
demand curve and allows an equilibrium. We assume this happens at the minimum admissible 
price P0. Note that this price level need not imply zero profits. If the farms are heterogeneous, 
some of them will be profitable if this price just covers average costs. Moreover, one does not 
need to be restrictive in specifying this price level with regard to costs only, it may also 
include  some  minimal  profit  margin.  The  situation  depicted  by  S1  above,  assumes 
homogeneous farms in terms of production functions. If this is not the case, then less efficient 
farms will be those to exit and the slope of the real supply curve S1 will be lower than that of 
S0 (instead of being the same as assumed on the graph). Such a case is represented by S’1. The 
quantity of consumption in this equilibrium will be Q1.  
The effect of the other mechanism for reaching equilibrium, that is the price discrimination, is 
similar. The case of pure price discrimination (when they is no quantity rationing) will be to 
shift  the  demand  curve  to  the  right  and  hopefully  to  achieve  an  equilibrium  solution.  In 
contrast to the quantity rationing mechanism, however, this is no longer guaranteed, since the 
extent to which this shift may take place is limited by the structure of demand. When most 
demand is represented by low income consumers, the scope of application of this mechanism 
is limited.  For this reason we focus primarily on quantity rationing. A more detailed analysis 
of  the  effects  of  price  discrimination  is  presented  in  Appendix  2.  The  effect  of  price 
discrimination combined with quantity rationing will be to alleviate the losses associated with   12
the non-full employment of production resources since it will allow for greater quantities to 
be sold. 
Let  us  now  consider  the  possibility  for  subsistence  and  semi-subsistence  production. 
Furthermore we assume that subsistence production is less efficient than commercial in that it 
will produce less output with the same resources. This assumption is questionable, but if 
subsistence  production is  more  efficient than commercial, the  argument that it  can create 
positive effects at the sectoral level become trivial. The influence of this assumption on the 
argument  is  minimal  and  will  be  outlined  where  appropriate.  This  assumption  is  more 
innocuous  that  it  looks  because  the  main  property  of  subsistence  production  used  in  the 
following analysis is that of retaining part of the production for own consumption.  
In line with the above argument, the supply curve (represented on Figure 1 by S2) will bridge 
the discontinuity. At price P0, supply will be lower than that in the fully commercial case 
(because  of  the  superior  technical  efficiency  of  commercial  farms)  but  with  further  price 
increases it will move closer to S0 in line with agricultural commercialisation. If subsistence is 
assumed to be technically more efficient than commercial, then S2 would have been presented 
to the right of S0. 
S2 will be greater than the equilibrium supply S’1, because subsistence will employ resources 
that commercial farming cannot at this price level. Such an explanation raises questions about 
whether  these  resources  can  have  alternative  use  outside  agriculture.    The  two  main 
production resources used in small-scale subsistence agriculture are land and labour. Non-
agricultural use of land, if there are such possibilities, is almost always more profitable than 
agricultural and usually there are restrictions on the latter. Moreover, these will apply to the 
same  extent  in  both  cases  compared  here,  namely  totally  commercial,  and  subsistence 
agriculture. The issue with alternative use of labour is more complicated. It is nevertheless 
clear that the lack of alternative employment and income opportunities  (outside agriculture) 
is one of the main sources of subsistence farming (Kostov and Lingard, 2002).  Moreover, 
collapse of non-agricultural activities created the current income problems in rural areas in 
transition  (Kostov  et  al.,  1996).  Therefore  since  the  alternative  use  of  these  resources  is 
limited we assume it away. 
The intersection of S2 and D0 however, is not an equilibrium. Some of the production of the 
semi-subsistence sector is not marketed. Therefore S2 is a production curve, that consists of 
market supply and subsistence consumption. The market supply curve is presented on the 
graph by SM. A point of consideration is that the market price PM is smaller than P0, thus   13
apparently implying production with negative profits.   This need not be the case. The market 
supply  represents  formally  sold  production,  while  the  subsistence  consumption  comprises 
alongside own consumption transfers to friends and family, for which transaction costs are 
lower. This means that the differentiation between market and subsistence consumption is an 
expression of price discrimination and cannot be directly compared to the single price P0.  
The horizontal difference between the curves S2 and SM is production consumed within the 
subsistence sector. We also have to account for this subsistence  consumption in demand, 
because this will shift the (market) demand curve leftwards. The market demand DM is this 
shifted demand curve. The horizontal shift in the demand curve is smaller than the difference 
between the total production curve S2 and the marketed supply SM, because it is ‘cheaper’ to 
consume own production than to buy it from the market. The opportunity cost of consuming 
own production is lower that the market price. While in the transaction cost model this is the 
definition  of  subsistence  (de  Janvry  and  Sadoulet,  1994),  or  a  consequence  of  the  ‘non-
separability’ of production and consumption choices (Löfgren and Robinson, 1999), in the 
framework of the two stage decision process proposed in this paper, production costs are 
‘sunk’ costs at the second stage. If one takes poverty as a characteristic of countries with 
widespread subsistence farming, then the opportunity cost of consuming own production may 
be low. As Kostov and Lingard (2002: 89) put it  “the opportunity cost of the labour of a rural 
pensioner is zero”, meaning that for many of these people there is little chance of finding 
alternative employment or income sources. The total demand with no subsistence at the new 
equilibrium price PM  (denoted by point B) is less that the subsistence production at the same 
price (point C). 
Owing to the difference between the shift of the supply and demand curves, the equilibrium 
price with subsistence (i.e. PM) is greater than the intersection of the total production curve 
and the unshifted demand curve (that is of S2 and D0). The quantity of consumption in this 
new equilibrium is greater than the quantity Q1 in the fully commercial equilibrium. We can 
decompose the excess into the following components.  
The first is the difference between the commercial consumption (QM – Q1) in the cases of 
subsistence and commercial only eqilibria. The other component is the excess consumption 
borne by existing subsistence (the difference in the shift of the demand and supply). On the 
graph this additional consumption contribution of subsistence agriculture is represented by the 
horizontal difference between S2 and D0 ) at price PM, that is the segment BC. The segment 
AB, on the other hand represents the additional consumption gain, due to the lower, than in   14
the  fully  commercial  equilibrium,  clearing  price.  The  total  gain  in  consumption  and 
production  is  expressed  by  Q2,  which  is  the  quantity  at  point  C  (it  follows  from  the 
equilibrium condition that this quantity, which is total production at price PM, is the actually 
consumed quantity). Since this quantity exceeds both demand at this price which would have 
been  without  subsistence  (represented  by  D0)  and  the  quantity  that  would  have  been 
consumed  if  all  the  production  in  subsistence  agriculture  had  been  marketed  (that  is  the 
intersection of the total production curve S2 and the demand D0), there are positive impacts of 
subsistence agriculture. Since the segment AC (i.e. Q2 - QM) is the difference at the clearing 
price  between  total  production  and  marketed  production,  which  is  bigger  than  the 
corresponding difference between the market demand curve and demand which would have 
existed  without  subsistence,  the  effect  of  subsistence  agriculture  can  be  expressed  by  a 
fictional  aggregate  consumption  curve  which  is  the  sum  of  market  and  subsistence 
consumption. In order to get this curve one needs to add non-marketed production to the 
market demand. It is clear that this aggregate consumption curve would lie beyond (to the 
right  of)  the  reference  demand  without  subsistence  (D0).  This  displacement  of  aggregate 
consumption (which at the equilibrium price is the segment BC) to the right, illustrates the 
positive consumption effects of subsistence. 
We draw a change in the supply and production curves at the minimum admissible price for 
commercial  production,  because  of  the  possibility  at  this  price  for  upward  entry  of  fully 
commercial farms. The net effect of subsistence on the value of the marketed production is 
PMQM - P0Q1 and the net value effect on total production (market and subsistence) is PMQ2 - 
P0Q1. Whether these are negative or positive depends on the characteristics of subsistence and 
commercial farms (the difference in their technical efficiency represented by the different 
slopes  of  the  corresponding  supply  curves)  and  the  excess  supply  with  full  resource 
employment (Q0 - Q1). We speculate that while the former is likely to be negative, the latter 
may be positive. 
Another  important  result  of  the  economic  literature  is  that  existing  non-convexities  in 
production sets can alternatively lead to multiple equilibria which nevertheless may all be 
inefficient in a Pareto sense (Guesnerie, 1975). Our analysis presents an illustration of this 
which  is  represented  by  the  superiority  of  the  subsistence  equilibrium  over  the  fully 
commercial  one.  The  multiplicity  of  the  equilibria  follows  from  the  possibility  to  get 
commercial equilibrium with appropriate rationing at any price P > P0.
8 It is however clear 
                                                            
8 Similarly there is multiplicity of subsistence equilibria.   15
that  all  these  feasible  commercial  equilibria  are  Pareto  dominated  by  the  subsistence 
equilibrium and thus are inefficient. 
We  note  that  subsistence  basically  can  be  viewed  as  a  combination  of  the  two  main 
mechanisms for achieving equilibrium with non-convex production sets, namely rationing and 
price discrimination. Rationing is expressed by the withdrawal of some production from the 
market for own consumption. This restricts the potential fall in prices. Price discrimination is 
expressed in the two different modes of consumption: market and subsistence. While market 
consumption  is  determined  by  prevailing  market  prices,  subsistence  consumption  is  more 
dependent on quantity variables, such as relative availability of production surplus (which 
changes according to price signals and the orientation of subsistence producers).  The size of 
the production surplus defines the shadow price of own production. Nevertheless, this leads to 
effects similar to pure price discrimination, because aggregate consumption can be regarded 
as  a  sum  of  two  separate  components,  market  and  subsistence,  which  are  determined  by 
different prices. 
Comparing  subsistence  with  commercial  agriculture  only  on  the  basis  of  their  relative 
technical efficiency, that is the difference between their respective production curves (S0 - S2) 
does not take into account demand. Furthermore such a comparison is a direct result from the 
assumption  about  which  of  the  two  sub-sectors  is  characterised  by  greater  technical 
efficiency. We  have  to  compare  the  equilibria  resulting  from  commercial  only and  semi-
subsistence agriculture. The production effect is Q2 - Q1, and accounts for subsistence using 
resources unwanted by the commercial sector. If one wants to compare the full employment 
totally commercial state with a subsistence agriculture, this comparison will depend on the 
prevailing market price. If this price is below the minimum admissible commercial price P0, 
the production effect of subsistence would be positive because there will be zero production 
in the totally commercial case. If the price is P0, the production effect of subsistence will be 
negative (if it is assumed to be less efficient than commercial, but positive otherwise), but 
because the effective demand will be only Q1, the consumption effect of subsistence will 
again be positive.  
Subsistence agriculture introduces a fundamental non-convexity into production possibility 
sets (expressed in the change of the production curve at P0). Since aggregate consumption is a 
sum of market demand and subsistence consumption, this non-convexity carries over to the 
consumption  analysis.  The  introduction  of  non-convexities  may  in  principle  impede  the 
achievement of equilibrium. It should however be clear, that non-convexities in this case stem   16
from  the  entry  of  fully  commercial  farms  employing  different  technologies,  but  is  not  a 
consequence of the subsistence sector itself. A subsistence type agricultural economy is the 
only existing agricultural system that resembles the neo-classical economics image of the 
market. It is a non-convex system by definition. 
Since the possibility of existence of efficient equilibria is affected by the initial endowments 
(Brown and Heal, 1979) we have taken into account different possibilities about the point of 
departure in terms of initial conditions. We have to distinguish two separate cases in analysis 
of the effects of subsistence agriculture. The first is when the demand curve passes through 
the  discontinuity  in  the  supply  curve.  In  this  case,  the  existence  of  subsistence  practices 
facilitates the achievement of an equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium dominates the one of 
a fully commercial agricultural production in a Pareto sense. The position of the demand 
curve depends on the income and employment situation in a given country. 
In the second case, when the demand curve crosses the commercial supply curve (that is, on 
the graph, the demand curve is shifted rightwards), we deduce that the effects of subsistence 
agriculture will be negative if it is technically less efficient than commercial agriculture, but 
positive if it is  more efficient. We  illustrate only the former case. There is  an efficiency 
production loss (S0 - S2) and the totally commercial equilibrium will Pareto-dominate the one 
in which there is subsistence production, because both production and consumption will be 
greater  in  the  fully  commercial  equilibrium  alongside  a  lower  market  price.  This  case  is 
presented in Figure 2. 
 
Insert Figure 2. 
 
The above figure illustrates the possibility of a superior (in Pareto sense) commercial only 
equilibrium. Unlike the illustrated case which preserves the slope of the shifted demand curve, 
the shift of the latter which assumes improved incomes will lead to a change in its slope, 
making it steeper,  and will reduce  the superiority of the  commercial equilibrium. With  a 
steeper demand curve (that is less price sensitive demand) the fully commercial equilibrium 
point, corresponding to the illustrated subsistence equilibrium, will be to the left of the current 
one,  because  the  new  steeper  (less  price  sensitive)  demand  would  cross  the  commercial 
supply curve at a point that has both lower quantity and price than depicted. That is if we 
denote by P3 and Q3 the price and quantity characterising this equilibrium by Q’2 the aggregate 
consumption in the subsistence equilibrium corresponding to the new steeper demand curve,   17
and assuming that the market clearing price and quantity in the subsistence case remain the 
same, then Q1>Q3>Q’2 and P3<P1<PM. 
This leads to the following generalisation. The subsistence phenomenon is mainly due to 
insufficient  effective  demand.  Under  these  circumstances  the  effects  of  subsistence  on 
production and consumption are positive. The derivation of such positive effects depends 
exclusively  on  subsistence  withdrawing  some  production  from  the  market,  and  not  on 
assumptions about whether it is more or less efficient than the commercial sector in technical 
terms. The assumption about full employment of the available resources is not critical. It was 
used to depict a hypothetical situation, which was shown to be untenable since it could not 
yield  an  equilibrium.  The  totally  commercial  agriculture  and  the  subsistence  equilibria, 
compared to deduce the effects of subsistence agriculture, are both characterised by less than 
full employment in the case of insufficient effective demand (i.e. where the mechanisms of 
quantity rationing and price discrimination are necessary to lead to an equilibrium). When this 
is not the case however (i.e. when the equlibrium price exceeds P0), the full employment 
possibility cannot be ruled out. In this case the relative technical efficiency of subsistence 
farmers will be the main factor determining whether its effects are positive or negative. 
 
 
4. Longer term effects of subsistence  
The model of subsistence agriculture was shown to increase both aggregate production and 
consumption of agricultural products. In a country with a considerable agricultural sector and 
relatively low incomes, this would imply significant economy-wide effects. To demonstrate 
this  we  introduce  another  subsistence  concept  –  subsistence  consumption. We  distinguish 
subsistence  as  a  mode  of  consumption  from  the  concept  of  subsistence  as  a  mode  of 
production. While the latter refers to retaining part of production for own consumption, the 
former denotes a standard of living that allows satisfaction of some minimum standard of 
consumption. Sharif (1986) provides a comprehensive overview of this concept.  
Subsistence as a mode of consumption is defined with regard to some standard of material 
well-being.  This  is  how  subsistence  is  understood  in  classical  economics  (e.g.  Smith, 
Malthus). In this meaning subsistence is “a material consumption basket that is necessary for 
people to make a living and to reproduce themselves” (Bruntrup and Heidhues, 2002). This 
subsistence  level  is  higher  than  the  sheer  existence  minimum  (Sharif  1986).  Hence  the 
subsistence level is only vaguely defined as some kind of basic need or consumption basket   18
and this definition is temporally and spatially dependent.  The use of subsistence as a mode of 
consumption is related to the concept of a poverty line used by the World Bank. 
In order to show the importance of this concept we write the intertemporal individual utility 
functions in the following Stone-Geary type (following Steger, 2000): 
 
U[c(t)]= dt e









  (1) 
 
where t is the time index, c is the chosen consumption path, c  is the subsistence consumption 
level, θ is a preference parameter, ρ is an individual preference rate, a – the rate of population 
growth. The meaning of the utility function is that only levels of consumption exceeding the 
subsistence consumption level will generate welfare, i.e. we have a truncated utility function.  
This can be clearly seen, since if this is not the case i.e. if c<=  c  then the contributions that 
are integrated in (1) above are non-positive and therefore the final result (i.e. the utility) is non 
positive. 
  
When  the  intertemporal  Stone-Geary  utility  function  (1)  is  twice  differentiable,  we  may 
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Equation (2) shows that when actual consumption exceeds the subsistence consumption level, 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is positive. The more consumption exceeds the 
subsistence  level,  the  larger  the  elasticity  of  substitution  becomes.  Since  a  major  role  of 
agricultural production is provision of food, looking at the subsistence level of consumption is 
important. In the  case of the wealthy nations,  the subsistence consumption level is small 
compared to actual consumption and can be ignored. In the case of poorer nations however, 
there  is  a  link  between  subsistence  agriculture  and  poverty.  The  subsistence  level  of 
consumption  can  play  a  significant  role,  it  will  restrict  the  possibilities  for  intertemporal 
substitution, i.e. of savings which enable longer term growth. When consumption is below the 
subsistence level, then the elasticity of substitution is negative creating a ‘poverty trap’. Such   19
effects have been investigated in the economic growth literature (see for example Ben-David 
(1998) for the exogenous growth case and Steger (2000) for an endogenous growth model) 
and it was demonstrated that the subsistence level of consumption alone can in low-income 
countries  lead  to  negative  economic  growth.  Thus  there  may  be  a  negative  correlation 
between  the  level  of  subsistence  and  growth,  but  the  subsistence  level  does  not  lead  to 
negative growth per se. 
Let us now look in more detail at the effects of subsistence agriculture. For this purpose we 
rewrite (2) as: 
 






  (3) 
 
Let us further assume that c >  c , ruling out the extreme poverty case. In addition to the 
greater utility, which although directly derivable from (1), is obvious, we have the effects on 
the  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution.  The  positive  aggregate  consumption  effects  of 
subsistence  agriculture  can  be  expressed  as  decreasing  the  last  term  in  the  brackets  and 
increasing (3). In the case of individuals who directly consume subsistence production from 
their own farms or by social transfers based on kinship links, this directly increases their 
individual consumption c. In the case of individuals who depend mainly on the market, the 
price  decreasing  role  of  subsistence  agriculture  is  the  way  in  which  their  consumption 
increases. The individual share of the increase in the aggregate consumption Q2-Q1 (Figure 1) 
of any product of subsistence farming will be positive for every individual consumer and will 
increase  everyone’s  individual  utility,  compared  to  a  totally  commercial  agriculture. 
Furthermore, one would expect that due to the positive effects of subsistence on basic food 
products,  individual  consumers  will  be  able  to  dedicate  more  of  their  income  to  other 
products. The immediate effects of subsistence agriculture on the food sector are likely to 
create spill-overs in other sectors. Such spill-overs are related to the choice to produce at the 
first stage of the decision process. With regard to this choice the alternative of buying the 
same  product  at  a  price  that  is  higher  than  the  shadow  price  is  avoided  and  raises  the 
possibility for spill-overs, by saving some monetary income that would have otherwise been 
spent on purchasing these products.  It is important to distinguish between this choice and the 
choice whether to sell or consume the available production (i.e. the second stage choice). By 
definition,  subsistence  is  determined  by  the  shadow  price  in  the  band  between  effective   20
selling and buying prices however, the foregone monetary income is not able to provide the 
same level of utility as the consumption of this production. During the second stage both 
shadow price and selling price are already known and therefore the decision to forego or not 
the income from selling (part of the) production is optimal.  The spill-overs will be greater 
where the role of agriculture in the national economy is greater, and where the social role of 
subsistence agriculture in creating a social security net for relatives living in urban areas is 
more  strongly  expressed.  The  existence  of  such  positive  spill-overs  is  dependent  on  the 
assumption that current consumption exceeds the subsistence level. The possibility for such 
spill-overs only arises if this is the case. Additionally, it is necessary that the conditions under 
which  subsistence  agriculture  increases  (with  regard  to  totally  commercial  agriculture) 
production and consumption, to be met. 
 
5.  Conclusions and policy implications 
The proposed two-stage decision process accommodates both the transaction cost and the risk 
aversion models of subsistence agriculture.  The first stage in this process is characterised by 
the concept of orientation, while the second stage is an outcome of circumstances. Policies 
that modify these circumstances may lead to a shift away from subsistence. An example of 
such  policies  are  those  reducing  transaction  costs  relevant  to  subsistence  producers.  The 
rationale behind these policies is to reduce the width of the transaction costs band (i.e. the 
band  between  selling  and  buying  prices  for  agricultural  products)  and  thus  reducing  the 
probability that the shadow price for these products is situated in that band.  For analytical 
reasons we distinguish two types of reductions. The first is when the buying price is reduced, 
keeping the selling price at the same level.  In this case the purchase price may become lower 
than the shadow price making purchase more desirable than production.  This will transform 
current subsistence producers into net buyers of agricultural produce.  The efficiency of such 
policies will depend on the availability of alternative income allowing subsistence farmers to 
move  outside  agriculture.  In  other  words  the  reduction  of  the  purchase  price  has  to  be 
accompanied by an increase in the shadow price. This would not only make such a shift more 
likely, but ensure that it is permanent.  This corresponds to moving people out of subsistence 
agriculture to alternative non-agricultural employment, and is the most likely driving force for 
agricultural commercialisation. Such a development will also lead to an increase in the selling 
price because the withdrawal of resources from agriculture will increase their relative scarcity   21
and limit the potential for subsistence agriculture playing a stabilising role as shown in section 
3. 
The other analytical case in relation to the transaction cost reduction is when the selling price 
is increased, but the purchase price is kept at the same level. In this case the shadow price is 
likely to drop below the selling price thus making sale desirable and transforming subsistence 
farmers  into  commercial  producers.  This  can  be  viewed  as  pure  agricultural 
commercialisation  in  the  sense  that  resources  will  be  transformed  from  subsistence  into 
commercial use (not necessary implying any change in the sense of production organisation).  
Since such a change implies that total consumption is more or less constant and the shadow 
price is stable, we may view it as a ‘pure’ transaction cost reduction in that reductions in 
market distortions allow agricultural producers to get a better price in the face of unchanged 
demand. Although the scope of the latter transformation is limited in comparison to the non-
agricultural  transformation,  and  further  limited  by  the  role  of  subsistence  in  employing 
production resources unwanted elsewhere, it should not be neglected.  
It should be clear that the above distinction is based on analytical convenience. Any change 
will be a combination of the above two cases. What it shown is that the possibilities for 
agricultural commercialisation lie predominantly outside agriculture and the transaction costs 
story is better viewed as a symptom of a more general economic misbalances, rather than a 
primary cause for subsistence agriculture.  
While the general picture of what causes subsistence and what can eliminate it is clear, what 
is  much  less  clear  is  what  might  be  the  immediate  reactions  of  subsistence  farmers  to 
economic measures and policies.  These are not simply a matter of fine tuning of policies, but 
are important with respect to both policies aimed at restricting the extent of subsistence and 
policies  designed  to  work  within  the  framework  of  widespread  subsistence  agricultural 
production.  It is for these purposes where the concept of orientation, linked to the first stage 
of  the  decision  making  process  may  be  particularly  useful.  Orientation  defines  the  price 
responsiveness  of  subsistence  farmers.  Market  oriented  subsistence  farmers  will  react 
immediately  to  improved  market  conditions  by  reallocating  part  of  their  production  from 
consumption to the market. Their first stage decision prepares them for such a possibility. 
Subsistence orientation is based on the premises that they will remain subsistence, and since 
orientation is a forward looking concept, the response of subsistence-oriented farmers will be 
slower and of smaller magnitude. The orientation of subsistence farmers is nevertheless a 
largely under-researched area.  The claim that it is relatively stable (Kostov and Lingard, 
2002) needs to be substantiated. Mishev and Kostov (2002) argue that due to differences in   22
their mindsets, young people are not likely to be engaged in future agricultural production, 
and although the average age of subsistence farmers is likely to decrease, they will remain 
mostly  middle-aged.  The  age  structure  of  subsistence  farmers  and  their  inability  and 
unwillingness  to  unlearn  already  learned  patterns  of  behaviour,  may  provide  some 
justification for the relative stability of their orientation. Orientation is subject to evolution 
and needs to be studied. The market orientation of most subsistence farmers in transition 
countries  may  be  subject  to  change,  but  until  it  is  available,  processes  of  agricultural 
commercialisation may be facilitated. In addition to the issue of orientation, the relation of the 
current level of consumption and the subsistence consumption level, need to be investigated 
to assess the longer-term effects of subsistence agriculture. Unlike some developing countries, 
it may not be unreasonable to assume that in most countries in transition current consumption 
exceeds  the  subsistence  level.  Under  this  assumption,  the  static  longer-term  effects  of 
subsistence may be positive. 
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Figure 3 Appendix 1 
Mathematical representation of the two-stage decision model 
 
In order to clarify the two-stage decision making approach we present the following 
simplified model. We assume that all farmers are rational optimisers   (in terms of 
expected utility theory). The decision process can be presented as follows: 
Stage one (given expected price PS for the selling price and PB for the purchase price) 
to decide on producing quantity Q1 and buying quantity Q2, may be represented as: 
 
Q1 = F (PS , PB)  (1.1) 
Q2 = G (PS , PB)  (1.2) 
Where F(.) and G(.) are some functions. 
 
Similarly the second stage decision is: given the available production and the price 
realisation R, decide to sell quantity Q3 or to consume quantity Q4. This translates 
into: 
 
Q3 = H (RS , RB)  (1.3) 
Q4 = E (RS , RB)  (1.4) 
 
In empirical research the functional form for the functions F(.), G(.), H(.) and E(.) 
have to be decided by the researcher. An additional restriction for the sum of Q3 and 
Q4 will be necessary. 
To illustrate the potential use of this model we employ the assumption of rationality 
and express it as: 
RS = PS + e;    e ~ N(0, 
2
e s )  (1.5) 
RS = PB +u;    u ~ N(0, 
2
u s )  (1.6) 
Q3 + Q4 = Q1 + v;    v ~ N(0, 
2
v s )  (1.7) 
 
(1.5) and (1.6) express the consistent price expectations, while (1.7) demonstrates that 
the quantity produced is consistent with the first level decision with allowance for 
yield effects (say because of weather) The last equation is simplistic, but we use it 
here for the sake of illustration. 
Note that some of the above variables, in particular ones referring to the first stage 
decision are not directly observable. We nevertheless obtain a tractable model if we 
replace them with appropriate expressions containing observable (i.e. second stage) 
variables. Using (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7) to replace the expressions in (1.1) and (1.2) and 
introducing the actually bought quantity Q5 we get: 
 
Q3 + Q4 -v = F (RS –e, RB-u)  (1.8) 
Q5  + Q4 = G (RS –e, RB-u)  (1.9) 
 
The model then consists of equations (1.3), (1.4), (1.8) and (1.9) with the additional 
error terms e, u, v, specified in (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7) and can be used for two distinct 
purposes. One is to simulate the effect of the institutional environment (by randomly 
drawing  the  error  terms  from  distributions  with  different  variance  levels). 
Alternatively one may wish to express the buying price in terms of the selling price 
and simulate the model in terms of transaction costs. The other use of the model is to estimate the relationships embedded in it. This would 
involve representing it as a statistical model, which means introducing additional error 
terms for each equation. Since equations (1.8) and (1.9) already contain error terms, 
the  model  would  contain  four  equations  and  seven  error  terms  and  cannot  be 
estimated by standard maximum likelihood. It is nevertheless tractable for estimation 
purposes. Its estimation depends on the specification of the functions F(.), G(.), H(.) 
and E(.). Where these are linear, the model can be estimated by iterative generalised 
least squares techniques, like the various versions of the Expectation Maximisation 
algorithm. If these are non-linear, this may not be feasible, but multiple imputation 
methods  (e.g.  Markov  Chain  Monte  Carlo  or  Importance  Sampler)  may  be  used 
instead.  Appendix 2 
Price discrimination effects 
 
The example of price discrimination is shown in Figure 2.1. Let us assume that there 
are  two    consumers(or  types  of  consumers)  and  the  quantities  consumed  are 
correspondingly Q’0 and Q”0. This implies that   
Q’0 + Q”0 = Q0  
We can assume with no loss of generality that the first group of consumers are less 
price elastic than the second. This means that the slope of their demand curve D1 will 
be steeper. In order to demonstrate the effect of price discrimination we assume that 
there is a production monopoly that allows producers to set two different prices for 
these two consumers. For simplicity let us further assume that the price differences 
are set with the same difference say  DP with regard to the original price P0.  This 
means that if the new prices charged to the two consumers are correspondingly P1 and 
P2. then: 
 
P1 – P0 = P0 - P2 = DP 
 
The  price  discrimination  would  be  beneficial  for  producers  if  one  can  obtain  a 
situation  in  which  total  revenues  exceed  their  original  level  (at  price  P0).  To 
investigate this possibility we can set 
 
D 2 = Q2 - Q”0  
D 1 = Q’0 - Q1  
 
The sum of the sales revenues under price discrimination are as follows 
 
S = P1Q1 + P2Q2 = (P0 + DP)*(Q’0 - D 1) + (P0 - DP)*(Q”0 + D 2)   (2.1) 
 
Setting R = P0Q0 = P0Q’0 + P0Q”0 and after some substitution and reworking we get: 
 
S = R + DP(Q1 – Q2) + P0(D 2 - D 1)   (2.2) 
 
It is clear that, in this example, price discrimination can increase sales revenues if 
 
S - R = DP(Q1 – Q2) + P0(D 2 - D 1) >0  (2.3) 
 
The latter holds if the price inelastic group of consumers account for a large part of 
total consumption.  To see that let us rewrite (2.3) as (using that DP>0): 
 
(Q1 – Q2) > -P0/DP*(D 2 - D 1)   (2.4) 
 
Since the RHS of (2.4) is negative  the above inequality holds if the LHS is non-
negative, i.e. if the consumption of the price inelastic group of consumers exceeds that 
of the other group, this is true. Even if the latter does not hold, if the difference 
between the quantities consumed by these two groups are relatively small, this may 
still be the case. In the latter case we need  
 
|Q1 – Q2| < P0/DP*(D 2 - D 1),   (2.5) 
where | .| stands for absolute value.  It follows from the above example that in order for price discrimination to bridge the 
discontinuity in the supply function, requires a considerable part of demand to be 
relatively  price  inelastic,  i.e.  to  be  backed  up  by  well  off  consumers.  The  latter 
condition is difficult to maintain for poor countries and therefore price discrimination 
can only play auxiliary role. For this reason we do not analyse it in detail. 
 
 